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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH - MOTION
PICTURE EXHIBITION
A New York statute required all motion pictures to be licensed
by the Board of Regents before exhibition to the public and
further provided that, unless a picture be "obscene, immoral,
inhuman, or sacrilegious, or of such a character that its exhibi-
tion would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime," a license
should be issued.' Appellant's previously issued license to ex-
hibit the film "The Miracle" was revoked by the Board on the
ground that the film was sacrilegious, and this decision was
upheld by the Appellate Division2 and the New York Court of
Appeals.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held: reversed. The exhibition of motion pictures is a mode of
expression protected against state infringement by the First
Amendment through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because the term "sacrilegious" is too broad, the
New York procedure was not a permissible prior restraint on
such expression and is therefore unconstitutional.
As the Court indicated in its opinion, the principal case repre-
sents a shift in the Court's attitude concerning the nature of mo-
tion pictures and their effect on public opflion. In 1915 it was
held in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission5
that in view of the propensity for evil of movies, a statute which
gave a board of censors the power to forbid the exhibition of
films which were not "moral, educational, or amusing and harm-
less" was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.
To the contention that such censorship violated the guarantees
of freedom of speech and of the press under the state constitu-
tion, the Court answered that although motion pictures might be
a media of thought, the exhibition of them was a business carried
on for profit like other spectacles and could not be regarded "as
1. N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 122 et seq.
2. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N.Y.S.2d 740
(3d Dep't 1951).
3. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (1951).
4. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5. 236 U.S. 230 (1915). The same decision on a similar statute was made
in Mutual Film Corporation v. Hodges, 236 U.S. 248 (1915).
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part of the press or as organs of public opinion. ' ' 6 The Court
further ruled that the above quoted words set up a standard
sufficiently clear to forestall arbitrary judgment by the censors.
Similar opinions were voiced in lower federal and state decisions
on similar facts.7
The first step in the transition from the Mutual Film rationale
to that of the principal case occurred in 1925 in Gitlow v. New
York, 8 where it was held that the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment were protected from state encroachment by means of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1931 the
Court ruled further in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen9 that any
arrangement whereby a restraint was put upon the communica-
tion of ideas before their communication was a forbidden in-
vasion of freedom of speech and of the press. At the same time
the Court in that case pointed out that the principle of immunity
from previous restraint was not without limitation but that only
in exceptional circumstances could such a restriction be justified.
Following soon after these important judicial developments
was the realization that the basic thesis of decisions like the
Mutual Filn case did not square with either the judicial treat-
ment accorded other communication media or the true character
of the modern movie. It was pointed out that in the case of other
mass media, neither the fact that they were operated for private
profit nor their propensity for evil had been considered a decisive
6. Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230,
244 (1915).
7. Fox Film Corporation v. Trumbull, 7 F.2d 715 (D. Conn. 1925);
Block v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 251, 87 N.E. 1011 (1909); Pathe Exch., Inc. v.
Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N.Y. Supp. 661 (3d Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236
N.Y. 539, 142 N.E. 274 (1923) ; Thayer Amusement Corporation v. Moulton,
63 RI. 182, 7 A.2d 682 (1939). But cf. Public Welfare Pictures Corporation
v. Brennan, 100 N.J. Eq. 132, 134 AtI. 868 (Ch. 1926). In Thayer Amuse-
ment Corporation v. Moulton, 63 R.I. 182, 189, 7 A.2d 682, 686 (1939),
the court stated:
Motion pictures are undoubtedly within the category of shows and
exhibitions, and for more than a century these have been considered
along with rope or wire dancing, wrestling, boxing, and sparring
matches, and also roller skating and dancing in rinks and public halls,
as subject to regulation and even prohibition under the police
power..
In Pathe Exch., Inc. v. Cobb, supra, even newsreels were held subject to
censorship on the ground that they were not a part of the press within
the meaning'of the state constitution.
8. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936).
9. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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reason for denying them constitutional protection.-0 In addition,
with the invention of the sound track and the growing use by
film producers of controversial social and political issues as texts,
it became generally recognized that the motion picture was no
longer a mere "spectacle" but was in fact an important organ
of public opinion."
The Court, consistent with its other decisions in this area,
explicitly pointed out that the extension of the constitutional
guarantee to motion pictures did not mean that movies were free
from all censorship. A narrow exception to the general prohibi-
tion against prior restraints exists, but the statutory basis of the
restraint must satisfy a test on vagueness which the Court itself
has indicated is stricter in the case of limitations on freedom of
expression than in other situations. 2 In the principal case, the
term "sacrilegious" could not meet this severe test, and thus the
statute was struck down. With regard to the type of statutory
wording which will meet the above test and thus will continue to
be a source of possible restriction to movie exhibition, it has been
indicated that narrowly drawn statutes forbidding the use of pro-
fane, obscene, or lewd language would not raise a constitutional
issue. 3
In holding that the exhibition of motion pictures should be
given constitutional protection, the Supreme Court not only made
its opinion with reference to motion pictures consistent with its
decisions concerning other media of expression but gave judicial
recognition to the true character of the modern movie.
10. Note, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 702 (1951).
11. Id. at 704-708.
12. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
13. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1937). The same opinion was indicated in the
principal case. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952).
Another possible source of limitation on the showing of motion pictures
is the "clear and present danger" doctrine, which has been applied to re-
strict speech which tends to incite to crime or other illegal acts or which
threatens the existence of organized government. Near v. Minnesota exc rel.Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
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